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Abstract
The focus of comparative corporate governance scholarship is shifting from takeovers to
controlling shareholders in recognition of the fact that public corporations everywhere but
in the U.S. and U.K. are characterized by a shareholder with effective voting control.Debate
is now turning to the merits of controlling shareholder systems, both on their own terms and
in comparison to the U.S. and U.K. widely-held shareholding pattern. To date, the debate
has treated the controlling versus widely-held distinction as central, disagreeing over
whether a particular country owed its characteristic shareholder distribution to the quality
of minority shareholder legal protection or to politics. This simple dichotomy is far too
coarse to provide an understanding of the diversity of ownership structures and their policy
implications. This article complicates the analysis of controlling shareholders and corporate
governance by providing a more nuanced taxonomy of controlling shareholder systems. In
particular, it distinguishes between efﬁcient and inefﬁcient controlling shareholders, and
between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private beneﬁts of control. The analysis establishes
that the appropriate dichotomy is between countries with functionally good law, which
support companies with both widely-held and controlling shareholder distributions,
and countries with functionally bad law, which support only controlling shareholder
distributions. In this account, the United States and Sweden are the same side, rather than
on opposite sides of the dividing line. The articles examines the different understanding of
the role of controlling shareholders in corporate governance and the policy implications
that ﬂow from a taxonomy that focuses on support of diverse shareholder distributions.
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The big issue in corporate governance scholarship is in the process of
changing. Over the last fifteen years, the focus of academic and policy debate has
been on hostile takeovers. The terms and tenor of the debate in the United States are
by now numbingly familiar. The same pattern is now observable in Europe1, where
the tone of the debate, if not necessarily its politics, seems to have moderated a great
deal.2

*

Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, Charles J. Meyers
Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, and fellow, European Corporate Governance
Institute. An earlier version of his paper was presented as a lecture on the occasion of the Swedish
Corporate Governance Forum’s 10 Year Jubilee Seminar on The Future of Corporate Governance I
am grateful to Jubilee seminar participants and to participants at workshops at the 4th Asian Corporate
Governance Conference, Bank of Italy, University of Cambridge School of Law, University of
Florence Faculty of Law, Universita Cömmerciale Luigi Bocconi (Milan) , Universita de Cattolica
Faculty of Law (Milan), Institute for Law and Finance (Frankfurt), Stanford Law School, and the
Kirkland & Ellis Law and Economics Workshop for helpful comments. I also benefited from
comments by Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, Victor Goldberg, Jeremy Grant, Jeffrey Gordon, Curtis
Milhaupt, Gunnar Nord, Robert.Ohlsson, Katherina Pistor, Mark Roe, Mathias Siems, Rolf Skog, OkRial Song, and Marco Ventoruzzao.
1
Fifteen years ago, European and American views differed quite dramatically. Two quotes capture the
tension of the period. In the face of the mainstreaming of hostile takeovers in the United States and
United Kingdom’s business culture and jurisprudence, Continental Europe had a radically different
conception. The Chairman of the Deutschebank described hostile takeovers as one of the “blunders of
American Capitalism.” Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate
Control, 43 Kyklos 635, 635 (1990) (citing Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung, Dec. 23, 1983) In turn,
Francois Mitterand, the President of the French Republic, characterized hostile takeovers as
“gangsterism and the law of the strongest.” Id. (citing Le Monde, Gef. 14, 1989).
2

Marco Becht, an active participant in the European academic debate and a sophisticated observer of
the politics of European corporate governance, recently described the now civilized role for hostile
takeovers in Europe: “An European market for corporate control is seen as an integral part of a single
market and a major driver of European competitiveness, innovation and growth.” Marco Becht,
Reciprocity in Takeovers, ECGI Working Paper No. 14/2003 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003. To be sure, the European Parliament finally approved the aptly
numbered Thirteenth Directive only in a form substantially diluted from a Commission proposal that
would have gone a great deal further in establishing a European market for corporate control, but at

As the issues surrounding hostile takeovers have clarified, attention has begun
to shift from debating a phenomenon observed largely in the United States and the
United Kingdom, because only in those two jurisdictions is control of most public
companies in the public float, to understanding the kind of control structure that
dominates public corporations everywhere other than the U.S. and the U.K. Put
simply, public companies in the rest of the world have a shareholder or group of
shareholders with effective voting control, often but not invariably without
corresponding equity holdings. Debate is now turning to the merits of controlling
shareholder systems, both on their own terms and in comparison to the U.S. and
U.K.’s widely-held shareholder systems.
In this article, I venture some early thoughts concerning how this inquiry
might usefully be framed. As I will develop in more detail, the simple dichotomy
between “controlling shareholder” systems and “widely-held shareholder” systems
that has largely dominated academic debate thus far seems to me much too coarse to
allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership structures in different
national capital markets and their policy implications. My goal here is to complicate
our analysis of controlling shareholders and corporate governance by taking a first
step in developing a more nuanced taxonomy of controlling shareholder structures,
and then by examining the implications of this view on our understanding of widelyheld and controlling shareholder systems. Most important, I will argue that this
familiar dichotomy in fact is simply wrong, leading to the conclusion, surprising in
terms of the current debate but straightforward in light of a more complicated
taxonomy, that the appropriate distinction is between systems that support a diversity
of shareholder distributions and systems that essentially support only a controlling

least the debate came to be framed in terms of subsidiarity and reciprocity rather than by epithets like

2

shareholder distribution. From this perspective, the United States and Sweden,
typically thought of as, respectively, the quintessential widely-held and controlling
shareholder systems, have much more in common with each other than Sweden has
with most other controlling shareholder systems.
Important early work on controlling shareholder regimes has taken two
general directions. The first, reflected in a series of articles by combinations of Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,3 linked
the breadth of shareholder distribution and the quality of a jurisdiction’s law. In this
account, controlling shareholder regimes exist because a jurisdiction’s legal system
does not protect minority shareholders from diversion of private benefits of control by
dominant shareholders. As a result, a controlling shareholder who takes a company
public will not part with control; if she does, someone else will purchase control in the
market and exploit her. The second direction finds the explanation for concentrated
ownership patterns in politics. In an important book, Mark Roe identified social
democratic politics as the driving force toward ownership concentration.4 Where
labor, through politics, speaks with a unified voice, capital must concentrate to
respond effectively.
While important contributions, neither scholarly direction seems to me
sufficient to explain the patterns of shareholder distribution we observe. As Roe
notes, we observe controlling shareholder regimes in jurisdictions with good law, so
law cannot explain the complete distribution. At the same time, we observe
controlling shareholder regimes in countries without a serious social democratic
movement, so politics is likely not all of the answer either. Additionally, because
both approaches are essentially path dependency accounts – the initial condition,

gangsterism.

3

whether quality of law or character of politics, dictates the pattern of shareholder
distribution – they lack an efficiency account of the success of some controlling
shareholder regimes. As I have argued elsewhere, “[t]he path dependent
characteristics of a given national governance system confront the disciplining effects
of the operative selective mechanisms. In the end, institutions are shaped by a form
of corporate governance plate tectonics, in which the demands of current
circumstances grind against the influence of initial conditions.”5 Thus, a more
complete explanation for the distribution of shareholdings must incorporate politics,
law and efficiency, together with the serendipity of each country’s initial condition.
My effort to complicate the analysis of controlling shareholders and corporate
governance proceeds as follows. Part I sets out some necessary background
concerning both the phenomenon to be explained and prior efforts at explanation.
Part II provides a framework to structure the analysis, the controlling shareholder
tradeoff. Part III then begins to complicate the controlling shareholder taxonomy by
defining good law functionally rather than formally, and then distinguishing between
two very different kinds of controlling shareholders: efficient and inefficient
controlling shareholders. The result is to transform the sharp dichotomy between
controlling shareholder and widely-held shareholder distributions. Instead we see one
category encompassing controlling shareholders regimes with functionally bad law,
and a second, broader category encompassing regimes with functionally good law,
that supports a diversity of shareholder distributions and includes both Sweden, which
is characterized by companies with controlling shareholders, and the United States,
which is characterized by companies with widely-held shareholdings. Part IV then

3

See note 17 infra.
Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (2003).
5
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74
Wash. U.L.Q 327 (1996).
4
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continues the effort at complication by distinguishing between two different kinds of
private benefits of control: pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits. Part V
concludes with a brief consideration of some policy implications that arise from a
more complicated taxonomy of controlling shareholders.
I. Background: Facts and Generations of Scholarship
At the risk of belaboring a point that has become familiar, it is helpful to start
by recounting the actual ownership structure of publicly traded corporations. Over the
last 10 years, important empirical work has revealed that, excluding the United States
and the United Kingdom, the world wide corporate governance landscape has a single
monolithic feature: control of publicly traded corporations is typically lodged in a
single individual, family or group.6 Marco Becht, for example, reports that 82.5
percent of German listed companies, 65.8 percent of Italian listed companies, and
64.2 percent of Swedish listed companies, have a blocking shareholder minority of at
least 25 percent.7

Table 1
Control Blocs in Selected Countries
Germany

Italy

Sweden

Far East

Control > 25%

82.5%

65.8%

64.2%

---

Control > 50%

64.2%

56.1%

26.3%

67%

Source: Becht (2003); Claussens, Djankov & Lang (2000)

6

See, e.g., Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in The Control of Corporate Europe (F. Barca &
M. Becht, eds., 2001), Mario Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European
Corporations, 65 J.Fin. Econ. 365 (2002); Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier, Who Governs?
Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe, working paper (2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877; Stijin Classens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation
of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J.Fin. Econ. 81 (2000); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.Fin. 471
(1999).
7
Becht, supra note 2.

5

Moving the control level up to a majority lowers the percentage of listed
companies with a control block to 64.2 percent in Germany, 56.1 percent in Italy, and
26.3 percent in Sweden,8 but the importance of controlling shareholders remains
dramatic. For East Asian countries, Classens, Djankov and Lang found that a single
shareholder controls more than two-thirds of listed firms.9
It is also commonplace in Europe for control by a dominant shareholder to
result from structural devices that leverage voting rights above the level of equity
investment. For example, Table 2 shows that 66 percent of listed Swedish companies,
51.7 percent of listed Swiss companies, 41.3 percent of listed Italian companies, and
17.6 percent of listed German companies issue dual classes of common stock, with
one class having dramatically higher voting rights.10 Control is also frequently
enhanced through the use of pyramids and multiple control chains.11 The pattern is
repeated in East Asia.12

8

Id. at 19.
Classens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 6.
10
Becht, surpa note 2,. at Table 6. Dual class shares are rarely used in Portugal, Spain, Belgium and
France. Id. In Sweden, for example, Rolph Skog reports that controlling shareholders in companies
with dual class shares have 41 percent of the votes but only 21 percent of the equity. Rolph Skog, The
European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the “Breakthrough” Rule and the Swedish System of
Dual Class Common Stock 14 (working paper, 2003).
11
Becht, supra note 2, at Table 7. For example, of the firms in Germany with a control bock of 20
percent, 22.89 percent use a pyramid structure and 7.22 percent use a multiple control chain to leverage
their equity. See Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenson & Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance,
Economic Entrenchment and Growth, NBER Working Paper #10692 (Aug. 2004)(discussing use of
pyramid structure); Grant & Kirchmaier, supra note 6 (same).
12
“East Asian firms also show a sharp divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights – that is,
the largest shareholder is often able to control a firm’s operations with a relatively small direct stake in
its cash flow rights.” Stijn Classens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang,
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J.Fin. 2741, 2742
(2002).
9

6

Table 2
Use of Structural Devices to Leverage Voting Rights

% of listed
companies
with dual
class stock

Sweden
66%

Switzerland
51.7%

Italy
47.3%

Germany
17.6%

Source: Becht (2003)

The initial reaction to the empirical reality that systems in which control of
most listed companies is in the public float are the exception rather than the rule
reflected a teleological view of the evolution of capital markets. A U.S./U.K. style
widely-held distribution of stock ownership and control was seen as the end point of
corporate governance evolution; progress consisted of accelerating what selection
would make inevitable. While there were some early skeptics – Masahiko Aoki with
respect to “J-Form” governance in Japan13 and Julian Franks and Colin Mayer with
respect to “inside systems” in Europe14 were among the most tenacious – global
policy seemed to be influenced by this belief. A preference for dispersed
shareholdings was plainly evident in the IMF and the World Bank’s response to the
1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis; financial assistance was conditioned not just on
macroeconomic criteria, but also on corporate governance reform.15 The same

13

See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J.Econ. Lit. 1
(1990).
14
See, e.g., Julian Frank & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France,
Germany and the UK, 10 Econ. Pol’y 189 (1990)
15
See, e.g., Timothy Lane, et. al., IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand 72-73
(Int’l Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 178, 1999); Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough Action on
Economic Crisis, N,Y.Times, Nov. 26, 1997, p. A1. Ronald Dore captured something of the tone of
this perspective in relation to Japan:
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preference also seems to explain the centrality of breakthrough rules in the debate
over the Commission’s 2002 proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on takeovers.16
In turn, this quite skeptical view of controlling shareholder regimes was
provided academic support by a growing “law and finance” literature that sought to
reveal the empirical links between measures of the quality of legal regimes and the
nature of national capital markets and corporate governance systems.17 For present
purposes, a particular claim is central – that a controlling shareholder structure is
associated with “bad law.” Where minority shareholders are not protected from
controlling shareholders extracting large private benefits of control, the argument
runs, entrepreneurs will not part with control through public offerings because they
then would run the risk of their own subsequent exploitation by someone who
assembles control through the market and whose extraction of private benefits would
be unchecked by the legal system. Under this analysis, controlling shareholder
systems will be characterized by weak equity markets – too much liquidity tied up in
control blocks – and by large differences in the value of controlling and minority
blocks as a result of private benefit extraction by the controlling shareholder.

What … all these slogans [concerning Japanese capital market reform] add up to
is a general belief that (1) the principles according to which the typical
neoclassical economics textbooks say the economy works are a priori correct
principles, (2) those principles are best exemplified in the American economy;
(3) the rightness of those principles is further confirmed by American success,
and (4) Japan’s present plight is not just a cyclical phenomenon and a debtdeflation hangover from the bubble; it is the natural and wholly just retribution
on Japan for not following these principles.
Ronald Dore, Japan’s Reform Debate: Patriotic Concern or Class Interest? Or Both?. 25 J. Japanese
Stud. 65, 66 (1999).
16
As sent to the European Parliament for approval in 2001, the proposed Thirteenth Directive limited
the operation of structural features like dual class common stock with different voting rights when a
bidder secured more than 75 percent of the target’s equity. The result would have been to move the
European corporate governance environment in the direction of the U.S./U.K. pattern.
17
See, e.g., Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J.Fin. 471 (1999); Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
& Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of Outside Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Rafael LaPorta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J.Pol. Econ. 113
(1998); Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Ownership, 58 J. Fin. Econ 3 (2000). Charles P. Himmelberg, R. Glenn
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This brings us to a more recent, emergent generation of scholarship that, at
present, stresses two themes. The first, largely positive, argues that the parsimony of
the law and finance taxonomy – whether or not a national system is characterized by
controlling shareholders – camouflages a much more complicated reality. In fact,
countries with both good and bad law are characterized by controlling shareholder
systems.18 For example, both Mexico with bad law, and Sweden with good law, have
controlling shareholder systems. Moreover, countries with a controlling shareholder
system experience dramatically different levels of private benefit extractions, at least
as they have been measured so far.19 To stay with the same example, Mexican
controlling shareholders are said to expropriate approximately half the value of the
company;20 in contrast, expropriation by Swedish controlling shareholders is limited
to approximately 1 percent of company value.21
To further complicate the controlling shareholder landscape, controlling
shareholders come in different forms – for example, families as opposed to widelyheld corporations – and hold control through different devices; as we have seen some
controlling shareholders’ control is matched by their equity investment, while others’
control is leveraged through structural devices like dual class stock and pyramids. At
least in some countries, early empirical studies suggest that the level of private benefit
extractions differs among different types of controlling shareholders. Benefit

Hubbard & Insessa Love, Investor Protection, Ownership, and Investment: Some Cross-Country
Evidence (working paper, Sept. 2000), reaches a similar result using different econometric techniques.
18
See M. Roe, supra note 4.
19
See text at notes 36 - 42 infra.
20
See Tattiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 68 J.Fin. Econ. 325 (2003).
21
Mark Roe’s emphasis on politics as a determinant of shareholder distribution focuses on good law
jurisdictions, but it is equally applicable to a bad law jurisdiction. The demand for law is,
tautologically, politically driven. Thus, as we will see later, there will be a political story in every
jurisdiction. For example, political motivations are an important influence on business in countries
without a social democratic tradition. See, e.g., Pramuan Bunkanwanicha & Yupana
Wiwattanakantang, Tycoons Turned Leaders, working paper, Jan. 2005 (Companies whose executives
become high political officials outperform similar companies after the executives achieve office).
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extraction is lower when the controlling shareholder’s stock is widely-held, as
opposed to family owned, and when the divergence between control and equity is
smaller.22
Recognition of the variety of types of controlling shareholders and their
potential for having different impacts on minority shareholders gives rise to a second,
and as yet more tentative, theme in the new generation of controlling shareholder
scholarship. What, after all, is wrong with controlling shareholder systems? Here the
concern is normative. If controlling shareholder regimes do not necessarily lead to
large private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders, is there really
a problem? In turn, this point reads back on the Law and Finance lock-in theme. If
controlling shareholders need not fear subsequent dilutive private benefit extraction if
they part with control because private benefits of control are low, why do we still
observe a pattern of concentrated shareholdings? This defense of controlling
shareholder regimes surfaces clearly in Sweden’s energetic defense of its dual class
voting structure within the European debate over the Thirteenth Directive.23
So where does this recitation of familiar facts and emerging scholarly themes
leave us? When the world seems more complicated than what our theory can explain,
we probably do not yet understand the world. Put differently, perhaps the mistake is
in thinking that the critical factor in understanding corporate governance systems as
different as those of the Far East, Latin America, Europe and Scandinavia, is their
shared controlling shareholder systems broadly defined.24 And if this is right, then we

22

Classens, et. al., supra note 6 (East Asia); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in
Emerging Markets, 38 J.Fin. & Quant. Analy. 159 (2003).
23
See Skog, supra note 10.
24
Tolstoy’s complication of the dichotomy between good and bad families captures the point nicely:
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Leo Tolstoy, Anna
Karenina 3 (1963) (translated by Constance Garnett). While jurisdictions with widely distributed
shareholdings likely share a common set of characteristics, the intuition is that controlling shareholders
regimes differ in important ways among themselves.

10

need a richer taxonomy of controlling shareholder systems than we are currently
using. In this essay, I propose to take a first step in responding to that deficiency by
looking more closely at two central features of a more complex taxonomy: what is a
controlling shareholder, and the concept of private benefits of control. Both
complications turn out to provide useful insights into the role of controlling
shareholders in corporate governance.
II. A Framework for Analysis
The first step in complicating the taxonomy of controlling shareholders is to
understand what Jeffrey Gordon and I have called the controlling shareholder
tradeoff.25 The role of controlling shareholders lies at the intersection of the two
elements of the agency problem that is at the core of public corporation governance.
The first element is the familiar agency problem that arises from the separation of
ownership and control. This is the domain of governance devices like hostile
takeovers and independent directors that have been the focus of so much attention
over the last 20 years. While important techniques, these efforts to bridge the
separation have significant limitations. Getting the incentives of independent
directors right is difficult: paying them enough to secure their full attention may be
inconsistent with their independence. Takeovers, in turn, are rather blunt instruments:
they are responsive to only some kinds of governance problems,26 and the large
premium necessary for success both emphasizes their large transaction costs and
makes them appropriate only for very large problems.

25

The following discussion draws on Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U.Penn. L.Rev. 785 (2003)
26
For example, hostile takeovers may be an effective device at breaking up inefficient conglomerates,
which requires little internal information to sell off unrelated businesses, while fixing the problems of a
single business may require deep local knowledge of the business that may not be available to an
outside owner.
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From this perspective, a controlling shareholder may better police the
management of public corporations than the standard panoply of market-oriented
techniques employed when shareholdings are widely-held. This is the point that
motivates the efficiency defense of controlling shareholder systems. Because of a
large equity stake, a controlling shareholder is more likely to have the incentive either
to effectively monitor managers or to manage the company itself and, because of
proximity and lower information costs, may be able to catch problems early. Rather
than being the result of functionally bad law, a controlling shareholder system is in
this view an alternative to the frictions associated with ameliorating the separation of
management and control that inevitably arises from widely-held shareholdings.27
The second element of the public corporation agency problem is the conflict
between a controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders over the potential
for the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits of control – benefits to the
controlling shareholder not provided to the minority shareholders (and that drive the
bad law/controlling shareholder regime nexus). Thus, controlling shareholder
monitoring as a means to ameliorate managerial agency problems also comes with
frictions. Conditional on maintaining control, the less equity the controlling
shareholder has, the greater the incentive to use control to extract private benefits;
increased productivity accrues to shareholders proportionally to their equity, while
private benefits of control are allocated based on governance power. A controlling
shareholder may increase productivity by effectively managing the company or by

27

This is consistent with empirical findings that firm value increase in the level of inside ownership, at
least over the lower ranges. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J.Fin. 1147 (2002); John McConnell &
Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J.Fin. Econ. 595
(1990); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and Market
Valuation, 20 J.Fin. Econ. 293 (1988).
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effectively monitoring managers, but may take more than its share of the gain.28 As
we will see later, leveraged control may create an incentive to adopt strategies that
reduce productivity if private benefits of control are increased sufficiently.
There is, however, a point of tangency between these two elements. Because
controlling shareholders must bear liquidity and non-diversification costs from
holding a concentrated position as well as the direct costs of monitoring, some private
benefits of control likely are necessary to induce a party to play that role. Thus, from
the public shareholders viewpoint, the two elements of the corporate agency problem
present a tradeoff. Public shareholders will prefer a controlling shareholder as long as
the benefits from reduction in managerial agency costs exceed the private benefits that
the controlling shareholder will extract.
Framing the controlling shareholder structure as an alternative to techniques
such as independent directors and takeovers as a monitoring device, whose attraction
depends on a trade off between increased monitoring and increased private benefit
extraction, provides a framework to better understand the complexity of controlling
shareholder systems and the role of law. Different law may result in particular
controlling shareholder systems having very different costs and benefits.
III. Complicating the Controlling Shareholder Taxonomy: Different Kinds of
Controlling Shareholders
The central implication of the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework is
that the fact that a country has a controlling shareholder governance system is too

28

This is consistent with empirical findings that firm value decreases in the difference between equity
ownership and voting control. See Classens et. al., supra note 6; Lins, supra note 22; Paul Gompers,
Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual Class Companies,
NBER Working Paper 24 (Jan. 2004).
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general an observation to tell us very much.29 A first cut at a more complicated
taxonomy recognizes that a national pattern of concentrated control of publicly traded
corporations can be consistent with two very different equilibria. First, the ownership
pattern may reflect a structure of inefficient controlling shareholders, where because
of bad law the cost of private benefit extraction exceeds the benefits of more focused
monitoring of management – minority shareholders are net worse off from the
controlling shareholder’s monitoring effort. Alternatively, the ownership pattern may
reflect a structure of efficient controlling shareholders, where because of good law the
benefits of more focused monitoring exceeds the cost of private benefit extraction and
the value of minority shares increases as a result. From this perspective, an inefficient
controlling shareholder regime is a drag on the financial system, while an efficient
controlling shareholder regime can be a preferred alternative to market-based
monitoring.
This first step toward a more complex typology seems to have a good deal of
explanatory value. Without the ambition of being exhaustive, I survey in the
remainder of this Part the implications that follow from distinguishing between
inefficient and efficient controlling shareholder systems.
A. Inefficient and Efficient Controlling Shareholder Systems and the Quality of
Law
First, a more complex taxonomy provides a context to understand the more
nuanced empirical studies of controlling shareholder systems and, in particular, the
role of legal and quasi-legal institutions in supporting a particular ownership pattern.
For purposes of this inquiry, I have in mind the legal realist’s broader concept of law
than typically reflected in the law and finance literature. Good law limits private
29

To be frank, it is hardly a startling implication that a taxonomy that divides the world into two
categories – the U.S. and the U.K on the one hand and everyone else on the other – does not tell us very
much about the rest ot the world. The payoff has to come from the complications that follow.
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benefits of control to amounts that are smaller than the increased productivity from
more focused monitoring. To accomplish this, good law must specify substantive
standards; require sufficient disclosure that those with the power to enforce the
standards know of violations; and provide an effective enforcement process.30 This
can be accomplished through detailed legislation, as with European laws governing
corporate groups, or by judicially developed principles of fiduciary duty, as in the
United States.31
In turn, standard setting can be accomplished by formal legal rules or, as is
particularly important in the United Kingdom, through private regulatory
organizations. Further, the effectiveness of legal rules is influenced by the interaction
of other social institutions. For example, the specification of substantive standards is
facilitated by social norms as is the effectiveness of enforcement (the operation of
one’s conscience has low transaction costs).32 Similarly, an energetic and uncensored
press is complimentary to the formal disclosure process.33 Thus, while it is relatively
easy to describe the requirements of good law in this broader functional sense, it is
much more difficult to capture empirically other than through simple backward
induction – countries with low private benefits of control must have functionally good
law.34

30

See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Security Markets, 55 Bus. Law. 1565
(2000).
31
Vice Chancellor Strine’s review of the behaviour of Lord Black, the controlling shareholder of
Hollinger, Inc., is a good example of judicial standard setting. Hollinger Intn’l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d
1022 (Del. Ch. 2004).
32
See John C. Coffee. Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Examination of Private Benefits of
Control, 149 U.Pa. L.Rev. 2151 (2001). Economists have examined this intuition empirically by
studing the impact of differences in a country’s dominant religion – presumably a powerful source of
norms – on economic growth. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanas, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, Trust in Large Organizations, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 333 (1997).
33
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59
J.Fin. Econ. 537 (Dec. 2004).
34
For example, Dyck and Zinglaes, supra note 33, argue that a strong press is an alternative to good
law; it may substitute for gaps in the formal disclosure regime and, by publicizing norm violating
conduct, substitute through public shaming for gaps in the formal enforcement regime. Here I note
simply that the public press is itself much more effective when there is effective legal disclosure
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Now recall that the initial claim made by the law and finance literature was
that controlling shareholder systems were associated with functionally bad law:
entrepreneurs retained control to protect themselves against private benefit extraction
by someone who might subsequently assemble control if the existing controller gave
it up. Having retained control, the entrepreneur then exploits it by extracting private
benefits of control. This framework has clear empirical implications. In inefficient
controlling shareholder systems (1) the value of controlling shares should be
dramatically larger than minority shares; and (2) the extent of private benefits will
decrease in the amount of the controlling shareholders’ equity holdings and increase
in the difference between percentage of control and percentage of equity. In contrast,
efficient controlling shareholder systems will be characterized by functionally good
law; that is, law and related social institutions that effectively limit private benefit
extraction to an amount necessary to compensate a controlling shareholder for the
costs of focused monitoring and which is less than the benefit from focused
monitoring. Thus, in efficient controlling shareholder systems (3) the value of
controlling shares will exceed that of minority shares by a much smaller amount than
in inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
The new generation of scholarship supports all three implications of the
controlling shareholder tradeoff framework. The level of private benefit extraction
should be reflected in the difference in value between controlling and minority shares;
only the value of controlling shares includes the net present value of expected private
benefits of control. As shown in Table 3, the level of private benefit extraction in
functionally bad law regimes is large whether measured by the difference between the

regime. Thus, one may reason backwards from the presence of an effective press to the existence of an
effective disclosure regime.
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market price of high voting and low voting shares,35 or by the size of the premium
paid for a controlling block.36 Measured by differential market price, control
represents approximately 36 percent of firm value in Mexico, 29 percent in Italy, and
only 1 percent in Sweden.37 Mexico and Italy are typically characterized as bad law
states and Sweden as a good law state. Measured by the size of block premium to the
value of firm equity, control represents 34 percent of firm value in Mexico, 37 percent
in Italy, and 7 percent in Sweden.38 Both studies conclude that differences in the
quality of law account for a large portion of the difference between countries.

Table 3
Differential between controlling and minority shares in CS systems depends
on the quality of law

●PBC measured
by difference in
market price
●PBC measured
by control block
premium

Mexico
36%

Italy
29%

Sweden
1%

34%

37%

7%

Source: Nenova (2003); Dyck & Zingales (2004)

A recent study of Southeast Asian countries, also characterized by functionally
bad law, provides empirical support both for the relationship between the size of
controlling shareholders’ equity holdings and the extent of private benefit extraction,
and for that between the size of the difference between equity ownership and control
on the one hand and private benefit extraction on the other. In systems that are
dominated by controlling shareholders, firm value increases in the equity share of the

35

See Nenova, supra note 20.
Dyck & Zingales, supra note 33.
37
Nenova, supra note 20, at Table 3, p. 334.
38
Dyck & Zingales, supra note 33 at Table II.
36
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largest shareholder, and decreases with the size of the difference between control
rights and equity holdings.39
Finally, the link between the level of private benefits extraction and the quality
of law appears from the results of another empirical strategy. A recent study of large
publicly traded companies in South Korean, a jurisdiction characterized by a
controlling shareholder system, tracked the impact of a legal reform that mandated a
majority of independent directors; i.e., the reform added a component of good law.
Controlling for measures of productivity and all other governance characteristics,
Black, Jang and Kim find that large firms with 50 percent outside directors, required
by a recent change in South Korean law, experienced a 40 percent increase in stock
price.40 Of particular significance, the increase in stock price did not result from
increased firm productivity; companies did not become more productive because of a
majority of independent directors. Rather, the presence of a majority of outside
directors appeared to have caused the market to value more highly the company’s
existing cash flow. The authors interpret their results as showing the importance of
outside directors – i.e. functionally good law -- in controlling private benefit
extraction by controlling shareholders: “The most likely reason why outside directors
add value is that they may control self-dealing by controlling shareholders.”41

39

Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, supra note 12.
See Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’
Market Value? Evidence from Korea (July 2003), Stanford Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237,
http://ssrn.com/abstracts=311275. The authors do not address why the legal improvement actually
worked. In a country like Korea where a controlling shareholder structure is commonplace and private
benefits of control are large, one would expect that the new outside directors would not bring to their
new job a commitment to constraining a pattern that was commonplace in the business community.
Thus, while the empirical support for an important role for outside directors is strong, the explanation
for that role remains interestingly ambiguous.
41
Id. at 48. Making the same point a little differently, the authors state: “We do not find strong
evidence that better governed firms are more profitable or pay higher dividends. We do find that
investors value the same earnings or the same dividends more highly for better governed firms.” Id. at
6. A similar result emerges in a recent study of market valuation of research and development
investments in Europe. Hall and Oriani report that research and development investments by publicly
traded Italian firms are not as highly valued by the market as similar investments by German and
French firms. The authors attribute the difference to the potential for Italian controlling shareholders to
40
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In short, then, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework implies a
different relationship between the quality of law and controlling shareholder regimes.
As a first step, the quality of law distinguishes between types of controlling
shareholder regimes: functionally good law supports efficient controlling shareholder
systems; functionally bad law supports inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
As a second step, in Section III.C., I will argue that this understanding of the
relationship between quality of law and the character of a country’s shareholder
distribution undercuts the usual distinction between widely-held and controlling
shareholder regimes.
B. Functional Convergence and Diversity of Shareholding Concentration.
In an efficient controlling shareholder system, concentration of control operates
as a cost effective response to the managerial agency cost problem. It is observed
when the benefits of more focused monitoring exceed the limited extraction of private
benefits of control allowed in a country with functionally good law. This represents a
form of functional convergence – within limits, different corporate governance
systems may solve the same monitoring problem through different institutions.42
As well, we can expect diversity – different firm level ownership patterns –
within the same efficient controlling shareholder system. The efficiency advantages

appropriate the returns on the research and development investments. The authors report that they
“found a positive relationship between R&D and market value only after controlling for the eventual
control by the major shareholder.” Bronwyn H. Hall & Raffaele Oriani, Does the Market Value R&D
Investment by European Firms: Evidence from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms in France, Germany,
and Italy 24 (working paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=528989.
42
See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
Am. J.Comp. L. 329, 332-33 (2001); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic
Efficiency, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327, 332-33 (1996). For example, a controlling shareholder’s extraction
of private benefits of control by a controlling shareholder can be constrained by rules against selfdealing, or by a mandatory bid rule that forces the controlling shareholder to increase its equity
ownership and thereby decrease the attraction of benefits distributed based on control rather than
equity. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance, at 336-37. Note also how this account intersects
with Mark Roe’s political account of concentrated ownership. See Roe, supra note 4. Roe explains
why the politics of a particular country may lead to concentrated ownership. The efficiency account
here helps explain why concentrated ownership regimes in some countries succeed economically and
those in others do not – politics alone does not explain this difference.
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of a controlling shareholder in a system with good law that minimizes the potential for
private benefit extraction depends on the value gain that results from more focused
monitoring of management performance than possible with market-based techniques
like independent directors and the market for corporate control.43 So, following
Demsetz and Lane,44 the size of this value gain, in turn, should be sensitive to
differences in industry, companies, and controlling shareholders. For example,
focused monitoring by a controlling shareholder may have no comparative advantage
over market-based monitoring when competition in the product market is sufficiently
intense. So, in high technology industries characterized by intense product market
competition and rapid technological change, we may observe companies with widely
distributed shareholdings even in an efficient controlling shareholder system. These
alternative monitoring techniques make even limited private benefit extraction to pay
for more focused monitoring unnecessary.45 Similarly, a firm’s industrial
organization may influence the effectiveness of different monitoring systems. Large
private benefits of control require a mechanism to move large amounts of funds. The
easiest way, short of simple theft, is to use transfer pricing favorable to the company
in which the controlling shareholder has the larger equity interest. A controlled group
of firms whose businesses do not lend themselves to intra-group supply transactions
may credibly signal that private benefits of control are low.46 This technique would

43

The focus on the benefits of monitoring performance rather than merely the costs of private benefit
extraction distinguishes this discussion from that of Mike Burkhart, Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer,
Family Firms, NBER Working Paper 8776 (Feb. 2002), which treats monitoring as extending
principally to the consumption of private benefits by a non-owner manager.
44
See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Control and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. &
Econ. 375 (1983); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lane, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ, 1155 (1985)(Breadth of shareholder distribution is endogenous to
the corporation’s productive activity).
45
For discussion of product market competition as a monitoring mechanism, see Mark Roe, Rents and
Their Corporate Law Consequences, 53 Stan. L.Rev. 1463 (2001); Dyck & Zingales, supra note 33.
46
It is important to stress that the signal’s credibility depends on the structure of the controlled group
rather than on the quality of a country’s law. As a result, the technique is available to companies in
inefficient controlling shareholder regimes. While the absence of intra-group transfers reduces the
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be especially important to a company in a bad law country that did not wish to extract
private benefits of control. A signal of this type depends on industrial organization,
not on the legal system.
Diversity also may result from differences between particular controlling
shareholders with respect to their taste for or skill at focused monitoring. Such
differences may tip the balance between a controlling shareholder distribution and a
widely-held shareholder distribution for a particular company, so that some diversity
of shareholder distribution may exist in an efficient controlling shareholder system
even within the same industry. Thus, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework
predicts diversity of ownership structures within an efficient controlling shareholder
system. We should see companies with both controlling shareholders and widely-held
shares.47
In contrast, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework predicts much less
diversity of ownership structures within an inefficient controlling shareholder system.
In the absence of constraints on pecuniary private benefit extraction by a subsequent
acquirer of control, an existing controlling shareholder cannot part with control
without running the risk of subsequent exploitation. The only viable strategy for a
controlling shareholder who lacks the taste for control then would be to sell control to
someone who would more effectively use that control, rather than dissipate control
through a public offering. To be sure, this analysis does not rule out the presence of
any widely-held companies in an inefficient controlling shareholder regime. For

potential for private benefits of control, such transfers can also take place through “bail-out” mergers
among companies in which the controlling shareholder owns more of a poorly performing target
company than she does of the better performing acquiring company. See Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo
Kang & Jin-Mo Kim, Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business
Groups, 57 J. Fin. 2695 (2002)(evidence of value transfers to controlling shareholder in intra-chaebol
mergfers).
47
Part IV takes up in greater detail the importance of differences in tastes among controlling
shareholders in an efficient controlling shareholder system.
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example, companies that begin as widely-held, perhaps through privatization, may
survive, especially if the nature of the business restricts the opportunities for
transferring value to a controlling shareholder. Nonetheless, we would expect there to
be less diversity of shareholder distribution among companies in an inefficient
controlling shareholder system than in an efficient controlling shareholder system.
The available data support this prediction. Table 4 shows the percentage of
widely-held and family controlled public corporations in Sweden, an efficient
controlling shareholder system (one that constrains private benefits of control), and in
Italy, an inefficient controlling shareholder system (one that does not constrain private
benefits of control. While Sweden exhibits rough parity between publicly traded

Table 4
Distribution of Controlling Shareholder and Widely-held
Companies in Sweden and Italy

Sweden
Italy

Controlling Shareholder
(family)
46.94 %

Widely-held

59.61 %

12.98 %

39.18 %

Source: Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations
Table 3 (working paper,2003)

companies with a controlling shareholder and those with widely-held shareholder
structures, Italy has close to 5 times more companies with controlling shareholders
than companies whose shares are widely-held.48

48

Comments from participants in workshops in Italy at which an earlier draft of this article was
presented expressed skepticism that as many as 12.98 percent of Italian public companies were widely
held. A common theme was that the companies included within this number were either newly
privatized entities whose special structure prevented the aggregation of control form the outside, or
companies where there was a de facto controlling shareholder whose identity and control arrangements
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C. Diversity and Recasting the Dichotomy between Controlling Shareholder
and Widely-Held Shareholder Systems.

As described at the outset of this article, the main theme of the new
comparative corporate governance debate has been the difference between systems
characterized by companies with controlling shareholder and systems characterized
by companies whose shares are widely-held. Recognizing that different distributions
of shareholdings coexist in functionally good law jurisdictions calls into question the
usefulness (and accuracy) of this central feature of the comparative taxonomy. The
United States is treated as the quintessential widely distributed system. However, the
U.S. also has a large number of corporations with controlling shareholders. Most
prominently of late, both Google and Dreamworks went public with a “Swedish”
capital structure – the founders retained stock with ten times the voting power of the
class of common stock sold to the public. Recent research reports 255 U.S. publicly
traded companies with dual class stock,49 and 34 percent of the S&P 500 companies
with founder family equity ownership, whose holdings average 18 percent.50 From
this perspective, the U.S. and Sweden no longer fall on opposite sides of a widelyheld/controlling shareholder dichotomy, but are points on a single functionally good
law continuum, with the placement of a jurisdiction at a particular point in time
reflecting the particular history of the jurisdiction and the company, and the current
dynamics of industrial organization and capital markets.
The idea that the appropriate taxonomic line is between countries whose
systems support companies with diverse patterns of share distributions (widely-held

would not appear from the public records. These observers estimated that there were very few widely
held Italian public companies.
49
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 28.
50
Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A. Mansi & David. M. Reeb, Founding Family Ownership and the
Agency Cost of Debt, 68 J. Fin. Econ, 263 (2003). Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Family Control
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shareholder systems and efficient controlling shareholder systems) on the one hand,
and inefficient controlling shareholder systems on the other, finds further support in
data that shows that companies with controlling shareholders, and especially family
controlling shareholders, perform worse than comparable companies in inefficient
controlling shareholder systems,51 and better than comparable companies in efficient
controlling shareholder systems, at least when the family member involved in the
company’s operations is the founder rather than an heir.52 This outcome is consistent
with the controlling shareholder tradeoff developed in Part II. Where functionally
good law constrains the level of private benefits of control, minority shareholders
benefit from a controlling shareholder’s more focused monitoring, leading to better
performance. Absent constraints on private benefits, minority shareholders are net
worse off from a controlling shareholder. In countries where good law supports
diverse patterns of shareholders, the cost of a controlling shareholder increases when
power shifts from the founder to an heir, but here the problem is not a problem of the
legal system, but a regression to the mean in the talents of the founder’s families.
While this analysis puts the United States and Sweden on the same side of a
functionally good/functionally bad law divide, rather than on opposite sides of a
divide based on the prevalence of controlling shareholders, there remains, of course,
the question of explaining the differences between the two systems. While we
observe controlling shareholders in both systems, publicly held Swedish public
companies are characterized by controlling shareholders and U.S. public companies
are characterized by widely-held shareholdings. I will return to this question in the

and the Rent-Seeking Society, Davidson Institute Working Paper #585 (June 2003), report that 20
percent of large U.S. publicly traded firms have families with shareholdings of 20 percent or greater.
51
Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, supra note 11; Maria Faccio, Larry P.H. Lang, & Lesllie Young,
Dividends and Appropriation, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 54 (2001).
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next Part, after introducing another complication: the distinction between pecuniary
and non-pecuniary private benefits of control.
D. Path Dependency in Patterns of Shareholder Distribution
In the preceding section, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework
suggested that in countries with functionally good law (both widely-held and efficient
controlling shareholder systems) an individual company has available to it both a
controlling shareholder distribution and a widely-held distribution. Conditional on
the presence of good law, in some industries and in some circumstances a controlling
shareholder structure may be superior. In others, a widely-held shareholder structure
may be superior. Finally, the two patterns of shareholdings may in some
circumstance be functional substitutes; that is, they have equivalent monitoring
capacity. In the absence of extremely competitive markets and rapid technological or
market change, the domain over which the two patterns are substitutes may be
substantial.
In the domain where the two patterns are substitutes, the ultimate outcome may
be path dependent; that is, the pattern that develops will turn on a set of initial
conditions driven by factors other than efficiency, and with the passage of time will
prove costly to change even if a different pattern becomes more efficient at a later
date.53 So, for example, recent studies of the origins of the shareholding patterns in
the U.K and Sweden, in the end both functionally good law countries, stress local,
non-efficiency factors as explanations for each country’s start down a path toward
52

Anderson, Mansai & Reeb, supra note 50, at 265; Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, FoundingFamily Ownership and Firms Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. Fin. 1301 (2003);
Morck, Wolfenson & Yeung, supra note 11.
53
The application of a path dependency analysis to explain differences in industrial organization dates
to Michael J. Piore & Charles F.Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (1984), in which the point was to
explain on non-efficiency grounds the U.S. pattern of mass production and the European pattern of
smaller team oriented organization. For applications in the corporate governance context, see Lucian
Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, The Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 Stan. L.Rev. 127 (1999).
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widely-held or controlling shareholder systems.54 Once on that path, and contingent
on functionally good law, there is little to cause to change. Both systems support
efficient production, and will persist unless significant environmental change or, as
we will see, firm specific problems, substantially alters the balance. For a controlling
shareholder system, the frictions that hold the pattern in place range from the lock-in
effect of capital gains taxes on the sale of a controlling position,55 to the fact that even
if functionally good law keeps the size of pecuniary private benefits of control low, it
may do little about non-pecuniary private benefits, a distinction that will be addressed
in the next Part. As a result, persistence in shareholder distribution in efficient
controlling shareholder systems will depend in part on the persistence of controlling
shareholder tastes. Anticipating the outcome of the next Part’s analysis, an efficient
controlling shareholder system may be less stable than an inefficient controlling
shareholder system, and less dynamic than a widely-held shareholder system.
54

See Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, ECGI Finance
Working Paper No. 30/2003 (Sept. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=449460 (pattern the
result of coalition between labor and family owners to socialize capital without public ownership);
Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control,
ECGI Working Paper No. 9/2003 (Jan. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =354381 (“[T]he
U.K. is fundamentally different from most other countries.” UK shareholding patterns were the result
of implicit contracts enforced by informal relations of trust and confidence that encouraged
participation of largely local outside investors). See Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of
Patterns of Ownership and Control: The British Experience, 46 Bus. Hist. 256 (2002); Brian R.
Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public
Companies, 23 Ox. J.Leg. Stud. 1 (2003); Brian R. Cheffins, Are Good Managers Required for a
Separation of Ownership and Control, 13 Indus. & Corp. Change 591 (2004). In both cases, the path
dependency story is quite different than the Law and Finance story. In the Law and Finance account,
the existence of good law gives rise to widely-held and efficient controlling shareholder systems. In
these path dependent accounts, the direction of causation is reversed, initial serendipity giving rise to a
shareholding pattern that then demands good law. In the Swedish case, once politics allowed the
leading families to lock in control, a demand arose to assure that the locked in controllers did not steal.
John Coffee argues persuasively that this was the direction of causation in the United States as well.
John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the Role of the State, 111
Yale L.J. 1 (2001). In Sweden, the account is consistent with Roe’s political theory; in the U.K., it is
not. The lesson may be that every country’s initial conditions may be unique even if the outcomes
converge to one of a few patterns; politics characterize the initial conditions in some countries, but not
in others.
55
Capital gains taxes may reinforce the path dependency of controlling shareholder systems by
imposing a substantial change on a controlling shareholder selling its long held position even if, in a
world without taxes, changes in the economy would cause controlling shareholders to sell. Eliminating
this barrier to restructuring the ownership distribution of German corporations led Germany to
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IV. Complicating the Controlling Shareholder Taxonomy: Pecuniary versus
Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Control
In Part III, I extended the standard good law/bad law account of controlling
shareholder systems by complicating the taxonomy of controlling shareholder systems
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder systems. I
argued that an efficient controlling shareholder system has much more in common
with a widely-held shareholder system than with an inefficient controlling shareholder
system; both widely-held and efficient controlling shareholder systems support
diversity in shareholder distributions among companies and an inefficient controlling
shareholder system does not. The next step is to further complicate the taxonomy by
looking more carefully at the concept of private benefits of control, a central but to
this point largely unexplored element of the analysis, and one of great importance to
understanding good law systems that support diverse shareholder distributions.
Consistent with the vast majority of the existing literature, I have not as yet
defined what I mean by private benefits of control. That now needs to change. For
present purposes I want to make a quite simple conceptual distinction, which may turn
out somewhat less distinct in application, between two kinds of private benefits of
control. The first is pecuniary private benefits of control; that is, the non-proportional
flow of real resources from the company to the controlling shareholder. A familiar
example is tunneling accomplished by inter-company dealings whose terms favor the
company in which the controlling shareholder has the larger equity stake.56 The
second is non-pecuniary private benefits of control; that is, forms of psychic and other

eliminate the capital gains tax on the sale of long held cross-holdings. See Gilson, Globalizing
Corporate Governance, supra note 42, at 341-42.
56
See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90
Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proceedings) 22 (2000). In U.S. corporate law, the concept is similar
(although termed “self-dealing”: the highest standard of judicial review is reserved for a transaction in
which a controlling shareholder receives something of value to the exclusion and detriment of minority
shareholders. See Sinclair Oil Corp v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. SCt. 1971).
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benefits of control that, without more, involve no transfer of real company resources
and are not disproportionately dilutive of the value of the company’s stock to a
diversified investor. For example, control of a large company in a small economy
may provide a desirable social standing for the controlling family. A good analogy
may be to the difference between common values and private values in the economics
of auctions.57
The existing literature, both analytical and empirical, focuses almost
exclusively on pecuniary benefits of control although typically without
acknowledging the distinction.58 This can be seen most clearly in the empirical
literature. Whether measured by differences in value between high and low voting
classes of common stock, or by the premium paid for a control block relative to the
entire firm, these amounts reflect the capitalized value of real resources diverted to the
controlling shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders.59 As we have seen, a
number of studies show clearly that the market values the same cash flows differently
when produced by a company with an inefficient controlling shareholder as opposed
to an efficient controlling shareholder.60 The difference is pecuniary private benefits
of control.
Focusing on pecuniary private benefits of control, however, raises a real
quandary. The empirical evidence shows very low pecuniary private benefits of
control in efficient controlling shareholder systems. But holding a controlling
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In a common value auction, the asset has the same value to all bidders. In a private value auction,
the asset’s value depends on the bidder. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and
Bidding, 25 J.Econ. Lit. 699 (1987).
58
Dyck & Zingales, supra note 33 at 32, are notable in that they recognize the difference between the
two categories. Their principle point, however, is only to show the importance of pecuniary private
benefits of control -- “that not all private benefits are psychic” – rather than to examine the
implications of psychic benefits.
59
See TAN 35 supra.
60
See TAN 37-41 supra. Black, Jang & Kim, supra note 40, provide the best example. The same cash
flows increase in market value as a result of an improvement in law that reduces the potential for
pecuniary private benefits for controlling shareholders.

28

position imposes real costs in liquidity and lack of diversification on the controlling
shareholder, as well as actual the cost of monitoring. Why then do we ever observe
controlling shareholders in countries with functionally good law (widely-held and
efficient controlling shareholder regimes) if controlling shareholders can extract only
limited amounts of pecuniary private benefits of control? Unlike in an inefficient
controlling shareholder system, these controlling shareholders are free to sell their
positions without fear of subsequent exploitation by someone who subsequently
assembles a new control position. This is the realm of non-pecuniary private benefits
of control. Almost tautologically, non-pecuniary benefits of control must play a
prominent role in regimes where functionally good law keeps pecuniary private
benefits low.
While a comprehensive exploration of non-pecuniary private benefits of
control requires considerably more attention than I can devote here,61 a hypothetical
question can serve to motivate the analysis. Suppose a family that controls a firm has
a net worth of $4 billion, all invested in the controlled firm. What does the family’s
utility function look like? What does the family maximize? For example, suppose a
potential acquirer will pay a $300 million dollar premium for the family’s controlling
interest because the acquirer can increase the company’s productivity or capture
synergies. The family confronts a tradeoff: control of a major industrial company
versus a 7.5 percent increase in family wealth. Is maintaining a role as leading
industrialists in a country, with the social and political access associated with that
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For example, non-pecuniary private benefits of control may in some areas provide both psychic
benefits to the controlling shareholder and real benefits to the company (and, hence, to the minority
shareholders). Political influence may be the best illustration. The ability to influence political action
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role, worth more than additional wealth at a point where decreasing marginal returns
to wealth must surely have set in?62
To generalize the intuition, the existence of private benefits of control means
that for the controlling shareholder the separation theorem does not apply; that is, the
controlling shareholder’s utility is affected by company decisions in ways other than
through the decision’s impact on the company’s stock price.63 Thus, maximizing the
controlling shareholder’s utility may mean something other than maximizing the
value of the corporation. As with complicating the concept of controlling shareholder
in Part III, complicating the concept of private benefits of control has a number of
interesting implications.
A. Explaining the Difference between the United States and Sweden
The distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of
control helps explain the continuing differences between the incidence of controlling
shareholders in the United States and Sweden. The U.S. is characterized by widelyheld shareholder distributions, while Sweden is characterized by controlling
shareholder distributions, even though in both countries functionally good law
supports, and we observe, both patterns of shareholdings. Controlling shareholders in
countries with good law are compensated for the extra costs of their controlling
position through non-pecuniary private benefits of control. Thus, the different
patterns of shareholdings in the two countries should depend importantly on the
potential for non-pecuniary private benefits of control.
A first observation turns on the relative size of the two economies. Because
the Swedish economy is relatively small, a group of fifteen families were sufficient to
62
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dominate. Being one of fifteen leading families provides a social and political
position that is unlike anything in the United States, whose economy is simply too
large for a small number of families to play a national role comparable to that played
by the Swedish industrial families. Neither Warren Buffett not Bill Gates, for
example, looks like an American version of the Swedish Wallenbergs. Thus, nonpecuniary private benefits of control are likely to be generally smaller in the United
States, local rather than national, which suggests that we should observe fewer
companies with controlling shareholders. The smaller level of non-pecuniary benefits
of control should also increase the rate at which control is dissipated by controlling
shareholders and their heirs. Entrepreneurial companies making an initial public
offering almost always have a controlling shareholder. As we will see in section B of
this Part, the rate of reduction in control by the entrepreneurs’ heirs increases as the
level of non-pecuniary benefits go down.
A second observation builds on the first. We should observe controlling
shareholders in the U.S. in those industries where non-pecuniary private benefits of
control are likely to most pronounced. So, for example, one would expect to find
controlling shareholders in major newspaper companies, as is the case, for example,
with the companies that operate the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall
Street Journal and, until recently, the Los Angeles Times. Running a major national
newspaper puts one at the center of major public and cultural issues, with the potential
to influence the outcome. Like Dreamworks’ Swedish style capital structure,64
studies report that a dual class capital structure, designed to facilitate maintenance of
control without maintaining a controlling share of a company’s equity, are
disproportionately found in the printing, publishing and communications industries, as
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well as in media firms and sports teams.65 Examples include most large U.S. cable
television companies.66
Thus, the incidence of controlling shareholders in the United States and
Sweden, countries where functionally good law supports both widely-held and
controlling shareholder distributions, reflects not only the serendipity of where the
two countries started,67 but on a continuing basis the potential for non-pecuniary
private benefits of control as well.
B. Macroeconomic Implications of Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Control
The empirical evidence supports the proposition that minority shareholders are
not uniquely disadvantaged in an efficient controlling shareholder system. Good law
keeps diversion of pecuniary private benefits of control low and, in a reasonably
efficient stock market, the costs of these payments for focused monitoring, as well as
the risk that the talent of future generations of family managers will regress to the
mean, will be priced. Unlike in inefficient controlling shareholder systems, minority
shareholders in an efficient controlling shareholder system are playing in a basically
fair game.
The inquiry, however, does not end with the position of minority shareholders.
The existence of a significant role for non-pecuniary private benefits of control has
macroeconomic significance, which impacts the country as a whole. We take up three
such circumstances.
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Consider first the failure of separation just discussed. Some controlling
shareholders’ preferences may simply reflect misjudgment or over confidence. To the
extent that the controlling shareholder or her heirs wish to go on directly managing
the company, there may be a powerful inclination to over invest in the company’s
existing businesses – those with which the family manager is more comfortable –
even though other opportunities that require different managerial skills may offer
higher returns. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder may prefer to enter new
businesses about which she knows little but which are alluring personally; the
transformation of the businesses in which companies associated with the Bronfman
family engage – from liquor and oil to entertainment – may be an example. To the
extent these actions are motivated by non-pecuniary benefits of control, the fact that
they are value reducing may matter a great deal to the country as a whole even if
minority shareholders accurately predict both the controlling family’s preferences and
abilities.
A second implication of the failure of separation returns to the likelihood of
declining skills in successive generations of family managers – the operation of the
gravity of generations. Even if the risk of underperformance over time is priced, that
underperformance still operates as a drag on the economy through the misallocation
of resources. Recent empirical work shows that per capita GDP is highly and
significantly negatively correlated with measures of the extent of family control over
a country’s private sector.68 The underperformance appears to get worse as control
passes from founding entrepreneur to heir. Morck, Strangelend and Yeung report that
Canadian “heir controlled firms are less profitable than otherwise comparable firms in
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the U.S. and in Canada.”69 Data for Sweden, a functionally good law jurisdiction,
appears consistent. Minority share discounts in Swedish family complexes appear
related to factors other than pecuniary private benefits of control.70
The United States data concerning the impact of a shift from founder to heir is
more mixed. While an early study suggested that family ownership resulted in worse
performance than that of widely-held firms,71 recent work is more tentative,
suggesting that family controlled firms may outperform non-family controlled firms,
but that the advantage disappears when the heir of a founder serves as CEO (although
performance remains no worse than non-family firms). This description is consistent
with an efficient controlling shareholder structure that loses its advantage, but does
not deteriorate badly, when management passes to the next generation.72 There is a
plausible explanation for the difference in performance – both overall and with
respect to the slower deterioration in performance after management shifts from
founder to heir -- between family-controlled and widely-held companies in the U.S. as
compared to controlling shareholder firms in other countries with functionally good
law (countries that support both widely-held and controlling shareholder
distributions). The U.S., unlike for example Canada and Sweden, is not characterized
by pyramid ownership structures through which a family controls multiple levels of
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firms. Controlling families in the United States typically do not leverage their equity
to control more than one company.73 Thus, outside the U.S., the effect of less skilled
heirs taking over is both exacerbated by the greater difficulty of running a diversified
company and multiplied over a larger asset base.
A final implication may be the most significant. As suggested in Part III,
efficient controlling shareholders systems have greater diversity in patterns of
shareholder distribution. Part of this diversity is positive – driven by the fit between
particular companies and particular industries on the one hand and the monitoring
techniques associated with controlling shareholder or widely-held shareholder
distributions on the other. But part of this diversity may be negative – reflecting the
absence of market pressures on controlling shareholders to respond to changes in the
external economic environment and of market mechanisms to impose those changes
from the outside when the controlling shareholder fails to respond.
The insulation of the controlling shareholder from market pressure is not
necessarily always bad. As I have argued previously, “institutions matter when they
fit with existing industrial technology.”74 The stability that a controlling shareholder
can provide may be quite effective when, as with the happy match between Japanese
corporate governance and Japanese industrial organization over a large part of the
post-War period, it supports worker firm and team specific human capital investment
and the industry experiences largely linear technological change.75 The converse,
however, is also true: “institutions matter when they do not fit with the industrial
technology demanded in a state of the world different from that which gave rise to the
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governance institutions in the first place.”76 When companies and industries must
adapt quickly to large and abrupt changes in the economic environment, the stability
associated with an efficient controlling shareholder system becomes a barrier to
necessary adaptation; in this circumstance, a widely-held shareholder system, with
control open to the market, likely will be more efficient.77 In particular, a widely-held
shareholder system facilitates a dynamic cycle between public and private ownership
that polices adaptivity. When a public company experiences managerial
underperformance, the private equity market can mount an acquisition through buyout
funds that will put into place a highly incentivized, intensively monitored governance
structure that is suited to fixing the problem. Then, because the buyout funds
typically must liquidate after ten years, the now “fixed” company is taken public
again to allow the distribution of liquid assets to the buyout fund’s investors.78 If it is
difficult to design a system that is both adaptive like a widely-held shareholder system
and stability providing like an efficient controlling shareholder system, the choice
between them will depend on one’s predictions of the future: will the environment be
one that favors adaptation or stability? The public/private dynamic found in widelyheld controlling shareholder systems may serve to balance this tradeoff.
B. Ameliorating Influence I – The Potential Instability of Efficient Controlling
Shareholder Systems
Some factors work to ameliorate an efficient controlling shareholder system’s
insulation from market pressures for change. Precisely because non-pecuniary private
76
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benefits are idiosyncratic to the particular controlling shareholder, and because the
identities of controlling shareholders change with generations, it is plausible to expect
changes in the value of the non-pecuniary private benefits of control over time
(whether from lifecycle changes, increased wealth within a single generation, or
intergenerational changes in taste or abilities). At some point, the wealth gain from
adaptation reflected in a large acquisition premium, or an increase in market value
from giving up control and hiring professional managers, outweighs the nonpecuniary private benefits of control experienced by that controlling shareholder, a
process which can be expected to accelerate as succeeding generations experience
greater regression to the mean in managerial skills,79 and as the number of family
members actively involved in the company increases.
As a result, efficient controlling shareholder systems will tend to deteriorate
simply from the gravity of generations. For example, the recent SNS Economic
Policy Group report notes with respect to Sweden, an efficient controlling shareholder
system, that “[o]nly a few of the ‘fifteen families’ who used to dominate Swedish
industry remain major owners in a position of control… .”80 To the extent that the
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deterioration is in part driven by a control premium that increases with the value that
would result from change, the timing of the deterioration at least may be influenced in
the direction of efficiency: the greater the efficiency gain from adaptation, the faster
the deterioration of the controlling shareholder system.81
This assessment is consistent with another recent characteristic of the Swedish
system. Despite the dominant role of controlling shareholders, Sweden has
experienced a high level of takeovers, by definition friendly. Rolph Skog reports that
of the 245 Swedish listed companies that were taken over between 1990 and 2002,
157 or 64 percent had dual class stock with different voting rights, roughly the same
percentage as companies with dual class stock are among all listed companies. 82
This suggests that the circumstance when the size of the offered premium exceeds the
controlling shareholder’s non-pecuniary benefits of control may track the
circumstances that give rise to takeovers more generally.
C. Ameliorating Influence II – Public Pressure on Efficient Controlling
Shareholders
There is reason to think that external pressure may operate as some constraint
on controlling shareholders. The role of public opinion has been raised primarily in
connection with reducing pecuniary private benefits of control in bad law countries,
essentially as a substitute for an effective legal system.83 Public opinion driven
policing of non-pecuniary private benefits of control, however, may prove more
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difficult. For public opinion to operate as a constraint, two conditions are necessary
(although not necessarily sufficient). First, the controlling shareholder’s conduct must
be observable to the public, which is why the most promising empirical study of the
role of public opinion as a constraint on private benefits of control uses newspaper
circulation as a measure.84 Second, and for present purposes more difficult, there
must be a shared public conception that the behavior disclosed to the public is wrong.
This is plausible with respect to pecuniary private benefits of control – the concept
that “thou shalt not steal” is surely widely shared and diversion of company cash
flows for the benefit of a controlling shareholder may well be widely understood as
stealing. However, the range of behaviors that may provide non-pecuniary private
benefits of control may lack the same public consensus. Thus, the extent to which
public opinion acts as a constraint on non-pecuniary private benefits of control likely
is quite sensitive to the particular manifestation of the private benefit and to local
culture. For example, the extent to which nepotism is widely viewed as improper may
differ widely among jurisdictions.
More important, the characteristics that give rise to private benefits of control
are plainly culturally influenced. For example, the maintenance of family control –
the private benefit of being a leading family – may be more highly valued in Asia than
it is in the United States. Thus, Asian controlling shareholders may be willing to
forego more potential value to keep control in the family, with the result that a
controlling shareholder pattern may persist longer in Asia than in Western countries.
To be sure, culture and economics are related in complicated ways. In inefficient
controlling shareholder systems, a cultural attribute that assigns great value to the
non-pecuniary private benefit of maintaining family control reinforces the economic
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motivation to maintain control to avoid being exploited later as a non-controlling
shareholder. Conversely, the continued globalization of commerce, which serves to
increase the opportunity cost of the non-pecuniary benefits of maintaining family
control through forced competition with more efficiently organized companies, will
have the effect of eroding the cultural assessment of the value of control. Here,
however, we know as yet very little about the dynamics of the interaction between
culture and economics in determining the sources and intensity of elements of nonpecuniary private benefits of control.
V.

Implications and Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that a good deal can be learned by looking at the

usual taxonomy of controlling shareholders through the framework of the controlling
shareholder tradeoff – focused monitoring in return for some private benefits of
control and at a cost in speed of adaptation. In particular, the framework highlights
the value of distinguishing between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder
systems, and between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of control. I want
now to conclude by briefly considering two policy implications – one broad, the
second narrow – that are suggested by a more complicated controlling shareholder
taxonomy.
A. Eliminating Inefficient Controlling Shareholder Systems: Better Law or
More Market Exposure?
One straightforward implication of a more complicated taxonomy is the need
to eliminate inefficient controlling shareholder systems. This can be attempted by
three different, but not mutually inconsistent, strategies. First, an inefficient system
can be attacked directly by improving the legal system to constrain pecuniary private
benefits of control to levels that, net of these costs, leave minority shareholders better
off as a result of focused monitoring. At that point, the country will have moved into
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an efficient controlling shareholder system that is supported by non-pecuniary private
benefits of control that are subject to the ameliorating influences discussed in Part IV.
Second, an inefficient system can be attacked indirectly by changing legal rules and
supporting institutions to increase the exposure of control to the market. Third, the
capital market may in some circumstances operate to dissipate a controlling
shareholder’s position in just those circumstances when the social costs of
underperformance are the greatest.
1. Improving the Legal System.
Improving the legal system generally involves eliminating deficiencies in
three areas – the statement of the standards that make significant pecuniary private
benefits of control unlawful; the disclosure process that allows pecuniary private
benefits of control to be observed by those who have the power to enforce the legal
standard; and the public and private enforcement mechanisms available to prosecute
violations. This process can be slow, and certainly requires a political moment when
the public perception of the need for reform outweighs the influence of entrenched
inefficient controlling shareholders, but there is some evidence that it can happen.
Recent reform in Italy may be a case in point.
Recall that empirical studies show that in Italy private benefits of control
amount to as much as 30 to 37 percent of total firm value.85 In 1998, Italy adopted
legislation that made it significantly easier for minority shareholders to pursue
derivative litigation against management appointed by a controlling shareholder.86
Dyck and Zingales report a dramatic drop in the level of pecuniary private benefits of
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control after the reform, although the results can only be suggestive given the very
small sample.87 Effective January 1, 2004, additional new legislation in Italy
extended reform to both the standard specification and disclosure elements of a “good
law” system by substantially reforming the legislation governing groups of companies
dominated by a controlling shareholder.88 In addition to extending the circumstances
in which voting control imposes liability on the controlling shareholder for the
mismanagement of the controlled company management, the legislation imposes
extended disclosure obligations concerning transactions with the controlling
shareholder and, with respect to decisions actually influenced by the controlling
shareholder, a requirement to disclose the reasons for taking the decision in
question.89 While these reforms do respond to the demands of substantive standards
and disclosure necessary to a good law regime, it remains unclear whether the
enforcement requirement will be met. In the end, the effectiveness of enforcement
depends on matters of civil procedure and judicial efficiency, as to which
commentators have expressed reservations.90 Even the enforcement effect of nonjudicial institutions, like the public press, depends on the extent of widely-held
cultural beliefs that the pecuniary private benefits of control are improper.91
Despite the potentially important but still uncertain efforts in Italy, broad
based legal reform may move quite slowly in some countries. For example, as may
turn out to be the case in Italy, legislation may state standards of conduct more
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aggressively and may require more effective disclosure, but reform may still founder
on the enforcement process. If, for example, a country lacks a sophisticated and
effective court system, it may be a time consuming process to create one, even if
political barriers can be overcome. Without effective enforcement, improved
standards and more effective disclosure are unlikely to be enough.
In these cases, the second strategy – legal reform that exposes controlling
positions to the market – may be more effective. Here the most obvious example is
the mandatory breakthrough rule proposed by the Winter Report and reflected in the
2002 Commission draft of the Thirteenth Directive. Under the proposal, if a bidder
secures 75 percent of the target’s equity, then the extra votes of a high voting class
would be ignored for such things as election of directors. The effect of the rule would
be to sharply limit the extent to which a controlling shareholder could use certain
devices to lever its equity into control; a minimum of 25 percent of the equity value
plus one share would be necessary to command a majority of the vote.92 Importantly,
however, the coverage of the proposed breakthrough rule is only partial. Much of
European company controlling shareholder structures are based on devices that
heavily leverage the controlling shareholder’s equity through the use of pyramids
instead of or in addition to dual class common stock or other voting rules that are the
object of the breakthrough proposal. Pyramidal structures would not be affected by
the proposed rule,93 thereby reducing its impact even if it the Thirteenth Directive
would have been adopted as proposed.
For present purposes, the proposed breakthrough rule had two important
characteristics. First, it was to be imposed on a European level, thereby at least

controls and on officer certification, coupled with increased penalties and rigorous enforcement, makes
the kind of transfers associated with pecuniary private benefits of control much more difficult.
92
Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids in the European Union (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=315322

43

partially bypassing the political problem of controlling shareholder influence on a
particular country’s legislature.94
The second characteristic is rather more speculative. The Thirteenth
Directive, as imagined by the Winter Report and the Commission, might have had the
interesting effect of having a quite different impact on inefficient and efficient
controlling shareholder systems. For inefficient systems, control is opened up to
widely-held bidders, who will be in a position to purchase 75 percent of the equity at
a premium that shares with minority shareholders the gains from eliminating
pecuniary private benefits of control, much like shareholders participated in the gains
resulting from a 1980s style takeover motivated by eliminating the misuse of free cash
flow.95 In the free cash flow motivated takeover, the bidder shared the gains from
redeploying free cash flow through the premium paid for the target’s stock; the
remainder went to the acquirer through improved target performance. In an
inefficient controlling shareholder takeover, the bidder would share the gains from
better performance as a result of eliminating pecuniary private benefits of control
through the premium paid for 75 percent of the company’s equity,
In contrast, the breakthrough rule’s threat to control in efficient controlling
shareholder systems would be substantially more muted. Because of the low level of
pecuniary private benefits of control in an efficient controlling shareholder system,
there would be no easy source of premiums for would-be bidders. To be sure,
controlling shareholders would in some cases have to increase their equity ownership
to 25 percent to protect control, thereby increasing the costs of focused monitoring
and in particular circumstances resulting in a shift in the outcome of the controlling
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shareholders tradeoff, but European Union-wide, the balance would seem to be
positive.
That leaves the third, market-based, approach to improving the operation of
inefficient controlling shareholder systems. In an inefficient controlling shareholder
system, poorly managed companies, and those from whom controlling shareholders
have siphoned pecuniary private benefits of control, may require additional capital,
especially to respond to the globalization of their markets and to new, more efficient,
foreign competitors. For these companies, internally generated funds will be
insufficient, requiring recourse to the capital market. In this context, suppliers of debt
or equity can be expected to insist on a means to dissipate the controlling
shareholder’s influence if performance threatens the new investment. I suggested the
use of performance based conversion as a means of constraining controlling
shareholders four years ago,96 and discovered recently that just such a technique was
used with respect to a prominent controlling shareholder in Italy. In order to raise $3
billion for restructuring in 2002 from Italy’s largest banks, Fiat was required to accept
debt that was convertible into Fiat shares if certain financial targets were not met. If
the debt was converted following poor performance, the controlling Agnelli family’s
ownership in Fiat would be diluted from 30 percent to 22 percent, giving the banks a
30 percent interest and making them the largest Fiat shareholder.97 From this
perspective, globalization, even without additional regulatory initiatives, will operate
to undermine inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
B. Understanding the Dynamics of Efficient Controlling Shareholder Systems
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The most serious policy concern with efficient controlling shareholder systems
is that controlled firms adapt less quickly to changes in the economic environment.
Because private benefits of control are largely non-pecuniary, controlled firms in
efficient controlling shareholder systems may be less nimble in responding to changes
in the economic environments than widely-held firms. The market for corporate
control can force a widely-held firm to internalize change; nothing plays a similar role
in a controlling shareholder regime save the market mechanism just considered, which
in an efficient controlling shareholder system can be expected to operate rather slowly
because of the absence of the financial drain of tunneling. At the same time, we also
saw that the importance of non-pecuniary private benefits of control may make
efficient controlling shareholder systems less stable. From the perspective of the
controlling shareholder, the relative value of non-pecuniary private benefits of control
– the balance between non-pecuniary private benefits and the pecuniary gains from a
more adaptive control structure – can shift with the identity and generation of the
controlling shareholder.
At this point, however, we can do little more than identify the tension, rather
than either effectively model or test empirically the relationship. And this is an
appropriate point with which to conclude. To better understand the macroeconomic
impact of efficient controlling shareholder systems, we need to better understand the
micro level dynamics of this ownership structure. As the focus of corporate
governance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder systems, we need to think
small.
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